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Abstract
This paper analyzes whether government intervention on firms’ employment policies
have an effect on the employment of the elderly. As a result of the pensionable age
increasing in Japan, this policy makes a difference between the mandatory retirement
age and the pensionable age. The Japanese government has obliged firms to employ
elderly workers until they reach the pensionable age. According to literature, the labor
force participation rate of elderly male workers increased after the implementation of
this policy. However, according to this paper’s results, after omitting the unobserved
heterogeneity and controlling for worker demographics, there is no effect on the employ-
ment of the elderly workers. Consequently, this paper discusses why the government
intervention in the demand side of the elderly labor market has no effect on elderly
employment. According to this discussion, it is possible that a firm avoids the costs
from employing the elderly by using measures that are not illegal, while following the
directives of the law.
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1 Introduction
Retirement related policies, such as a reform of the pension system have become important
in developed countries as to sustain social security systems. Many developed countries have
faced the same problems of decreasing birthrate and ageing populations. As a population
ages, the cost of social security and social welfare increases, eroding the country’s budget. As
such, numerous developed countries have reformed their pension systems to reduce the cost
of social security and social welfare. Many developed countries, such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Korea have already decided to increase pension eligibility age over
the next decades. Japan has already increased pension eligibility age. Pension reforms in
developed countries are expected to influence retirement. As Gruber and Wise (1998) discuss,
the relationship between the social security system and retirement in developed countries has
attracted a lot of attention in economics. In many developed countries, regulations about
the mandatory retirement system have also been reconsidered when reforming the pension
systems, especially after 2000. For example, the UK, Germany, and France have reformed the
law that regulates mandatory retirement age. However, in the US, the mandatory retirement
system has been abolished in the 1960s.
In the US, there are studies that provide direct evidence on the effect of the abolition
of mandatory retirement age,1 which is discussed in this paper (Neumark and Stock (1999),
Ashenfelter and Card (2002), von Wachter (2002) and Adams (2003)). Ashenfelter and Card
(2002) analyze the labor market for university professors. According to their results, the
employment of workers protected by the law increases. Except in the US, there is not enough
evidence with respect to the effect of reforming regulations on the mandatory retirement
age, although some developed countries have reformed regulations regarding the mandatory
retirement system. In fact, the results in this paper are different compared to the result in
the US. Below, I discuss why this is the case.
In Japan, the government has changed the basic pension eligibility age from 60 to 65,
so as to decrease the payment amount for public pensions. However, many firms set their
mandatory retirement age at around 60. As a result, many elderly reach the mandatory
retirement age before they start receiving their public pension. The Japanese government has
recently encouraged firms to reemploy elderly people after reaching the mandatory retirement
age, until they arrive at the basic pensionable age (flat-rate part).2 This regulation is called
the Elderly Employment Stabilization Law (EESL). Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) was the
first to analyze this policy.3 They estimated the probability of being a salaried worker at
age 60-65. Moreover, they compared the 1945 birth year cohort with the 1946 cohort. The
result was that the 1946 birth year cohort was more likely to consist of salaried workers
at ages 60 and 61 by 2.4 and 3.2 percent, respectively. This effect seems small. However,
1Since Lazear (1979), theoretical research that answers why there is a mandatory retirement has developed.
Examples are the related studies such as Lazear (1981), Burkhauser and Ouinn (1983), Lazear and Moore
(1984) and Lang (1989).
2The government allowed firms that used a restrictive reemployment system not to remove it.
3Clark and Ogawa (1992) estimated the effect of the change in the mandatory retirement policy on the
wage profile before the EESL.
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they have the weakness of data limitation as I subsequently explain. The goal of this paper
is to estimate the effect of the EESL on the employment of the elderly and discuss how a
firm reacts to this policy after implementation. According to the results, before 2013, there
are no significant positive effects on the employment of the elderly, which is discussed in
subsequent sections. According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, there is an
exemption to the implementation of the EESL before 2013, and there are no clear statements
with respect to wage contracts when a firm engages in a contract with a worker who wants
to continue work after the mandatory retirement age. Additionally, there is an important
exception: before 2013, a firm could restrict the workers offered reemployment by accepting
the agreement from a labor union. This is an “escape route” from additional costs, which
firms could use. As explained, most firms react to this policy by introducing a reemployment
system, without abolishing the mandatory retirement system or increasing the mandatory
retirement age, which means that many firms choose a reaction that enables them to use
these “escape routes.” This point is further discussed in the subsequent sections.
There are numerous related studies that analyze government intervention in the labor
market. However, the studies directly analyzing the effect of changing the mandatory retire-
ment policy on the employment of the elderly are limited, and are discussed in the literature
review section. I also provide evidence by showing what happened after the implementa-
tion of the government intervention in the demand side of the elderly labor market. The
remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I discuss the effect of the EESL
and review literature; section 3 describes the data; in section 4, I explain the estimation
procedure; section 5 reports the results; and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Discussion and Literature Review
2.1 What is the EESL?
With respect to the EESL, Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) explains the details. Please see
Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) if you wan to know the details of the EESL. I will explain it
briefly. The Japanese pension program is divided into two parts; The basic pension (Flat-rate
part) and the income-related pension (Wage proportional part). The pension eligibility age
of these two programs are different. I show the pension eligibility age presented in Motegi
et al. (2016). In Japan, the pension eligibility age has gradually increased. For employees in
the private company or the public sector, the pension including the basic pension and the
income-related pension, which is called the Employees’ Pension Insurance or the Mutual Aid
Insurance, are provided. For self-employed workers, only the basics pension, which is called
the National Pension Insurance, is provided by the government.
The EESL is a law which obliges a firm to increase the mandatory retirement age or omit
the mandatory retirement system or give a reemployment offer and employ workers arriving
at the mandatory retirement age until they arrive at the basic pensionable age (Flat-rate
part) after 2006. Depending on the birth year of the elderly workers, the pensionable age
increases. The mandatory retirement age is around age 60 in Japan. As a result, for example,
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the elderly people with birth year 1945 arrive at the mandatory retirement age before they
arrive at the basic pensionable age (Flat-rate part)(age 63) if the mandatory retirement age is
age 60. The government prepares this law to fill a gap between the pensionable age (Flat-rate
part) and the mandatory retirement age. The figure 1 shows this fact. The year in the figure
1 means birth year (e.g. 1947, 1948). For example, with respect to workers with the birth
year between 1944 and 1945, there is a gap between the pensionable age (Flat-rate part) and
the age 60. The blue line shows the age when a worker receives pension (Flat-rate part).
With respect to the workers with the birth year after 1946, the government obliges firms to
increase the mandatory retirement age or abolish the mandatory retirement system or give a
reemployment offer and employ workers arriving at the mandatory retirement age until they
arrive at the pensionable age (Flat-rate part). This is the summary of the EESL.
However, in the EESL, there is a important exception. Before 2013, a firm can restrict the
workers who can get a reemployment offer by accepting the agreement from a labor union.
This exception has been omitted after 2013 and a firm is obliged to employ all workers who
want to continue to work in the firm after the mandatory retirement age. In addition, there is
no clear statement in the law with respect to wage contract when a firm gives a reemployment
offer to a worker arriving at the mandatory retirement age. As I will explain in the section 6,
many firms introduce the reemployment system without increasing the mandatory retirement
age or omitting the mandatory retirement age. When a firm makes a reemployment contract
with a worker, they discuss the decrease rate of wage with the worker who intend to work in
the firm after the mandatory retirement age. The law does not concretely oblige anything
with respect to the decrease rate of wage contract.
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Table 1: Public Pension Reform in Japan
Public
pension
reform year
Pensionable age
Employees’ pension Mutual aid pension
Flat-rate
part
Wage
proportional part
Flat-rate
part
Wage
proportional partBirth Cohort
Men Men & Women
-1941.4.1 - 60 60 60 60
1941.4.2-1943.4.1 2001 61 60 61 60
1943.4.2-1945.4.1 2004 62 60 62 60
1945.4.2-1947.4.1 2007 63 60 63 60
1947.4.2-1949.4.1 2010 64 60 64 60
1949.4.2-1953.4.1 2013 65 60 65 60
1953.4.2-1955.4.1 2013 65 61 65 61
1955.4.2-1957.4.1 2016 65 62 65 62
1957.4.2-1959.4.1 2019 65 63 65 63
1959.4.2-1961.4.1 2022 65 64 65 64
1961.4.2- 2025 65 65 65 65
Women
-1932.4.1 - 55 55
1932.4.2-1934.4.1 1987 56 56
1934.4.2-1936.4.1 1990 57 57
1936.4.2-1937.4.1 1993 58 58
1937.4.2-1938.4.1 1993 58 58
1938.4.2-1940.4.1 1996 59 59
1940.4.2-1946.4.1 2001 60 60
1946.4.2-1948.4.1 2006 61 60
1948.4.2-1950.4.1 2009 62 60
1950.4.2-1952.4.1 2012 63 60
1952.4.2-1954.4.1 2015 64 60
1954.4.2-1958.4.1 2018 65 60
1958.4.2-1960.4.1 2018 65 61
1960.4.2-1962.4.1 2021 65 62
1962.4.2-1964.4.1 2024 65 63
1964.4.2-1965.4.1 2027 65 64
1965.4.2- 2030 65 65
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
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Figure 1: The Elderly Employment Stabilization Law
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2.2 What is the effect of the EESL?
In this section, we will hypothesise what happened after the implementation of the EESL.
The EESL is a policy which makes Japanese firms continue to employ workers up to the
(Flat-rate part) pensionable age. This policy makes firms change their employment system.
As a result, this policy works as a restriction for firms. If we precisely understand the impact
of this policy, we have to analyze some channels which influence the outcome of whether
a worker works or not. For example, one is whether firms increase the number of offers
to re-employ workers (Channel (2)). The other is whether firms rescind or increase the
mandatory retirement age (Channel (1)). Another is whether workers accept the offer or
not (Channel (3)). If we only consider whether a worker work or not after the mandatory
retirement age, we cannot distinguish between three channels. The result in the literature
(Kondo and Shigeoka (2016)) catch the whole effect which combine these effects on each
channel. In this paper, to clarify and understand what is the effect of the EESL, I will discuss
the factors which decide the impact of this policy with respect to the labor participation rate
after the implementation of the EESL. By using this framework, we can understand what
the literature and this paper estimate. This framework helps us to interpret the result.
I will explain retirement path of a worker after the mandatory retirement age (Figure 2).
Let us assume that only one cohort exists. I explain the meaning of each node in Figure 2.
• Node 1: A worker i faces the mandatory retirement age.
• Node 2: A worker i does not face the mandatory retirement age.
• Node 3: A worker i receives a re-employment offer at age A.
• Node 4: A worker i does not receive a reemployment offer at age A.
• Node 5: A worker i accepts a reemployment offer at age A.
• Node 6: A worker i rejects a reemployment offer at age A.
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Figure 2: Retirement Path of Worker after the Mandatory Retirement Age
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Then, I define the following sets.
ATsalaried =
{
i
∣∣∣ i is a salaried worker at age T . }
Anode k =
{
i
∣∣∣ i is on node k. }
Then, I consider the meaning of the following probability.
Pr
{
i ∈ AA+1salaried
∣∣∣ i ∈ AAsalaried } (1)
I define the following probability in the following way to simplify the notation.
Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣ AAsalaried } = Pr{i ∈ AA+1salaried∣∣∣ i ∈ AAsalaried } (2)
I want to discuss the policy effects of the EESL by using the following expression. I show
that there are three important paths which through this policy influences workers and firms.
Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣ AAsalaried }
= Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 5}Pr{Anode 5∣∣∣Anode 3}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect Channel (1)
Pr
{
Anode 3
∣∣∣Anode 1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect Channel (2)
Pr
{
Anode 1
∣∣∣AAsalaried}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect Channel (3)
+Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 6}(1− Pr{Anode 5∣∣∣Anode 3}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect Channel (1)
)
Pr
{
Anode 3
∣∣∣Anode 1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect Channel (2)
Pr
{
Anode 1
∣∣∣AAsalaried}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect Channel (3)
+Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 4}(1− Pr{Anode 3∣∣∣Anode 1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect Channel (2)
)
Pr
{
Anode 1
∣∣∣AAsalaried}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect Channel (3)
+Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 2}(1− Pr{Anode 1∣∣∣AAsalaried}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect Channel (3)
)
I define the above expression for one cohort. To consider the difference of (1) between two
cohorts, I introduce another cohort. To simplify the discussion, consider that there are only
two cohorts C1 and C2. In addition, there is only one mandatory retirement age A. Assume
that the policy is introduced after cohort C1 faced the mandatory retirement age and some
people did not face the mandatory retirement age because some firms did not introduce the
mandatory retirement system. I analyze the difference between cohort C1 and cohort C2.
Let me omit the discussion of the difference of the following terms of (3) to focus on the
effects on the demand side of the labor market.4
4The effect on the four terms of (3) is caused by the difference in the characteristics of workers who arrive
at nodes 2, 4, 5, and 6. In fact, when workers arrive at nodes 2, 4, 5, and 6, workers decide whether they will
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Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 5} ,Pr{AA+1salaried∣∣∣Anode 6} ,Pr{AA+1salaried∣∣∣Anode 4} ,Pr{AA+1salaried∣∣∣Anode 2} (3)
By the way, Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 5} = 1 because a salaried worker will become a salaried
worker when he accepts a reemployment offer. The first effect which comes up on Effect
Channel (1) represents the path of the effect of acceptance of reemployment by workers.
Some firms may decrease wages to reduce employment cost when they reemploy workers
after the mandatory retirement age. If the amount of offered wage is very low when workers
are reemployed, these workers may reject the offer. As a result, the acceptance rate may
decrease. The second effect on Effect Channel (2) represents the path of the effect that a
firm prepares an office where workers are able to work after the mandatory retirement age.
Effect Channel (3) represents the path that some firms rescind or increase the mandatory
retirement age after the EESL. Then, we define ∆Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣ AAsalaried } as the difference of
Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣ AAsalaried } between C1 and C2. Finally, I can derive the following relationship
by the definition of probability measure.
∆Pr
{
(AA+1salaried)
c
∣∣∣ AAsalaried } = −∆Pr{AA+1salaried∣∣∣ AAsalaried } (4)
I discuss the relationship between (4) and the result of the literature. Kondo and Shigeoka
(2016) estimates βˆ61 − βˆ60 = 0.032 − 0.024 = 0.008. Let δ1 and δ2 be the factors which
are included in β61 − β60. I will explain in the next section. I explain the relationship
β61 − β60 = −∆Pr
{
(A61salaried)
c
∣∣∣ A60salaried } + δ1 + δ2 = ∆Pr{A61salaried∣∣∣ A60salaried } + δ1 + δ2
in the next section. I use the relationship (4).
2.3 Literature Review
2.3.1 Literature Review: What Did The Literature Estimate?
Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) used a dummy variable of being a salaried worker. The
outcome is influenced by the effects from multiple channels. I will explain this in detail.
They used the following outcome.
yi =
{
1 if i is a salaried worker at survey year.
0 if i is not a salaried worker at survey year.
(5)
They analyzed two cohorts which had the same pension eligibility age. If I consider
this environment, they utilize an environment where the difference of the following probabil-
try to be a salaried worker or not. If workers arrive at node 6, they have to apply to another firm. Whether
they become a salaried worker at age A + 1 or not depends on the state variables which workers have on
nodes 2, 4, 5, and 6. With the introduction of the EESL, the distribution of the characteristics of workers
on nodes 2, 4, 5, and 6 changes. However, these influences are not clear.
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ities Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 5} ,Pr{AA+1salaried∣∣∣Anode 6} ,Pr{AA+1salaried∣∣∣Anode 4} ,Pr{AA+1salaried∣∣∣Anode 2}
between the two cohorts is small. As I explained, Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 5} = 1. For example,
let us consider Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 2}. If two workers (workers 1, 2) with different pension
eligibility ages arrive at node 2, it is possible that the decision of these workers are different
conditional worker’s demographics. If the pension eligibility age of one cohort (worker 1)
is age A + 1 and the other (worker 2) is age A + 2, the worker 2 is more willing to work
conditional the worker’s demographics. I can discuss the terms Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 6} ,
Pr
{
AA+1salaried
∣∣∣Anode 4} ,Pr{AA+1salaried∣∣∣Anode 2} in the same way.
Agei is a vector of age dummy variables. Ageit = 1 means that the dummy variables
except the age t dummy variable are zero in vector Agei and the age t dummy variable is
equal to one. Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) estimated the following parameter5. Ti = 1 if birth
year of i is 1946.
β61 − β60 =
(
Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 1, Xi = x,Agei61 = 1]− Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 1, Xi = x,Agei60 = 1]
)
−
(
Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 0, Xi = x,Agei61 = 1]− Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 0, Xi = x,Agei60 = 1]
)
Then, I can rewrite this parameter in the following way. Here, Pr[yi = 1|Xi = x, Ti =
1, Agei60 = 1] = α60 + β60 + γ + δ
′x.
(
Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 1, Xi = x,Agei61 = 1]− Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 1, Xi = x,Agei60 = 1]
)
−
(
Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 0, Xi = x,Agei61 = 1]− Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 0, Xi = x,Agei60 = 1]
)
=
[(
Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 1, Agei61 = 1]− Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 1, Agei60 = 1]
)
Part 1
−
(
Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 0, Agei61 = 1]− Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 0, Agei60 = 1]
)]
−
[(∫
δ′xdF (x|Ti = 1, Agei61 = 1)−
∫
δ′xdF (x|Ti = 1, Agei60 = 1)
)
−
(∫
δ′xdF (x|Ti = 0, Agei61 = 1)−
∫
δ′xdF (x|Ti = 0, Agei60 = 1)
)]
I analyze Part 1. I can give an interpretation of Part 1. Let me define yti .
yti =
{
1 if i is a salaried worker at age t.
0 if i is not a salaried worker at at age t.
(6)
5They assume E[i|Xi = x, Ti = t, Agei = a] = 0
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Part 1 can be rewritten in the following way.
(
Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 1, Agei61 = 1]− Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 1, Agei60 = 1]
)
Part 1
−
(
Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 0, Agei61 = 1]− Pr[yi = 1|Ti = 0, Agei60 = 1]
)
= −
(
Pr[y61i = 0, y
60
i = 1|Ti = 1]− Pr[y61i = 0, y60i = 1|Ti = 0]
)
Part 2 (This part equals −∆Pr
{
(A61salaried)
c
∣∣∣ A60salaried })
+
(
Pr[y61i = 1, y
60
i = 0|Ti = 1]− Pr[y61i = 1, y60i = 0|Ti = 0]
)
Let me assume that the population of one cohort is fixed. If the mandatory retirement age
is age 60, Part 2 in the following expression means ∆Pr
{
(A61salaried)
c
∣∣∣ A60salaried }. This is the
difference in Pr
{
(A61salaried)
c
∣∣∣ A60salaried } between cohort 1945 and cohort 1946.
It is possible that the influence of the following parts are small if I consider the meaning of
each part.
•
−δ1 =
(∫
δ′xdF (x|Ti = 1, Agei61 = 1)−
∫
δ′xdF (x|Ti = 1, Agei60 = 1)
)
−
(∫
δ′xdF (x|Ti = 0, Agei61 = 1)−
∫
δ′xdF (x|Ti = 0, Agei60 = 1)
)
Remark: The difference in difference of conditional expectation about δ′x between age
61 and age 60. Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) used region dummies and the unemployment
rate as control variables.
• δ2 = Pr[y61i = 1, y60i = 0|Ti = 1]− Pr[y61i = 1, y60i = 0|Ti = 0]
Remark: The difference in the probability of being a salaried worker at age 61 while
they are not a salaried worker at age 60.
I derive the relationship β61−β60 = −∆Pr
{
(A61salaried)
c
∣∣∣ A60salaried }+δ1+δ2 = ∆Pr{A61salaried∣∣∣ A60salaried }+
δ1+ δ2. I use the relationship (4). Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) estimates βˆ61− βˆ60 = 0.032−
0.024 = 0.008. It is possible that this magnitude is produced by ∆Pr
{
(A61salaried)
c
∣∣∣ A60salaried }
and small factors δ1 and δ2. The estimate of Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) was influenced by
multiple channels from all the effects on the three channels which I discuss the section 2.2.
2.3.2 Literature Review: The Effect of the Government Intervention on the
Elderly Labor Market in the US
I will discuss the literature in the US. Since 1980s, the studies about the retirement has
continued. (e.g. Fields and Mitchell (1984), Alan and Thomas (1986) and Slade (1987))
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With respect to the mandatory retirement in the US, Neumark (2003) explains in detail
the history and the literature.6 Some studies have focused on the government intervention
on the supply side of the labor market. (e.g. Staubli and Zweimu¨ller (2013) and Neumark
and Song (2013)) I will discuss the results in the US which are deeply related to this paper.
Since around 1990 in the US, many literature have provided evidence with respect to how a
firm discriminates a worker based on the worker’s age. (e.g. Hutchens (1988), Hirsch et al.
(2000) and Adams (2002)) Johnson and Neumark (1997) analyze the consequences of age
discrimination in the workplace. Lahey (2008) analyzes the effect of age discrimination law
on the labor market.
The following four studies directly analyze the abolition of the mandatory retirement
system. I will discuss what this paper do and find in the next section based on the discussion
of these literature.
• Neumark and Stock (1999)
– After the implementation of age discrimination laws, the labor force participation
of workers protected by age discrimination laws increases.
– With respect to other workers which age discrimination laws do not protect, the
effect is not clear.
– They indicate that age discrimination laws steepen age-earnings profiles for work-
ers entering the labor market.
• Ashenfelter and Card (2002)
– A special exemption from the 1986 Age Discrimination Act allowed colleges and
universities not to abolish compulsory retirement at age 70 until 1994.
– After the abolition of mandatory retirement, the retirement rates at 70 and 71
year old fell by two thirds after 1994.
• von Wachter (2002)
– Overall, the labor force of workers 65 and older increases by 10 percent to 20
percent after the end of mandatory retirement. Neither job tenure nor wage of
older workers were affected.
• Adams (2003)
– This literature analyzes the effect of age discrimination laws on employment, hiring
and retirement.
– With respect to employment, the labor force participation rate increase in the
workers which the laws protect.
– However, there is no clear effect with respect to the workers which the laws do not
protect.
– With respect to hiring and retirement, there is no effect.
6Hurd (1990) explains research on the elderly from a broader perspective.
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2.4 Paper Objectives and Results
This paper analyzes the effect of the government intervention to the demand side of
the elderly labor market on the employment of the elderly. According to the literature
review, with respect to the workers which age discrimination laws protect, the labor force
participation rate increases. However, as I discuss in the following sections, I do not find the
same evidence in Japan. I discuss why I do not get the same result which many literature
have analyzed in the US.
Finally, I will discuss why the result is different from Kondo and Shigeoka (2016). This
is due to the difference in the estimation procedure. The estimation procedure in this paper
omits the unobserved heterogeneity and control important demographics. The answer from
this paper is that there is no significant effect if we control and omit the factors which cause
a bias of the coefficient. In addition, Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) indicate that the effect of
the EESl is weak even though there is a significant effect.
3 Data
I use the Preference Parameters Study provided by the Osaka University Institute of
Social and Economic Research.7 The Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University is
mainly conducted for calculating parameters of preferences defining utility function; time
preference, risk aversion, habit formation, externality. The panel survey has been conducted
every year since 2004. The surveyed people are drawn from men and women aged 20-69 years
old. This survey is conducted by a self-administered placement method. I use the dataset
from 2003 to 2013. I use only the samples whose birth year between 1941 and 1950. The
response rate is 71.1 percent at 2003. This panel data is suitable for this study because this
data includes the labor force participation around age 60 with respect to the samples with
birth year between 1941 and 1950.
In Japan, there is the dataset focusing only on the survey of the elderly people whose
name is the Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR).8 The Japanese Study of Aging
and Retirement (JSTAR) is a panel survey of elderly people aged 50 or older conducted by
the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, Hitotsubashi University, and, more
recently, the University of Tokyo. However, the JSTAR has been conducted since 2007, which
means that the labor participation information before age 60 is not available with respect
to the elderly people whose birth year is around 1945. As a result, I use the Preference
Parameters Study. This dataset is the most suitable panel data for this study. In section 5
which is main results in this paper, I use the Preference Parameters Survey. However, I use
the JSATR in section 6 to discuss our results. I explain what data of the JSTAR I use in
section 6.
Finally, in section 6, I use another dataset which is the Fact-finding Survey on the Work
Conditions among Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (Chusho kigyo rodo jijo jittai chosa)
7See the website (http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/surveydata/engpanelsummary.html) if you want to know
the detail of the Preference Parameters Study.
8See the website (http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/projects/jstar/) if you want to know the detail of the JSTAR.
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conducted by National Federation of Small Business Associations.9 The surveyed firms are
drawn from the firms whose number of employees is less than 300. This survey is conducted
by a self-administered placement method. This is a repeated cross section data. With respect
to firms whose number of employees is more than 300, a public repeated cross section data
is not available. In this survey, the information about the mandatory retirement policy
among small and medium-sized enterprises is available. In addition, there is no panel data
of the Japanese firms at this moment. With respect to the Study of Employment in Small
Companies, I also explain which data I use in section 6.
9See the website (https://ssjda.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/Direct/gaiyo.phpeid0407langeng) if you want to know
the detail of the Fact-finding Survey on the Work Conditions among Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.
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4 Estimation Procedure
In this section, I will explain the estimation procedure. I use only samples whose birth year
between 1941 and 1950. I estimate the following equation. This is similar to the difference
in difference method.
yit = β0 + λt + β11{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950}+ γ′xit + ai + it (7)
yit is an indicator equal to one when a respondent works at period t. λt is a time fixed
effect. ai is an individual fixed effect. xit are control variables at period t. xit include a
respondent age, family structure, whether a respondent arrives at their basic pensionable age
(Flat-rate part) and the amount of asset in the previous wave. I analyze the difference in the
labor force participation after age 60 between people with birth year between 1941 and 1945
and people with birth year between 1946 and 1950. The coefficient β1 identify this effect.
The following relationship shows this point.
(E[yit′|λt′ = λ′, 1{60 ≤ ageit′}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} = 1, xit′ = x, ai = a]
−E[yit|λt = λ, 1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} = 0, xit = x, ai = a])
−(E[yit′|λt′ = λ′, 1{60 ≤ ageit′}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} = 0, xit′ = x, ai = a]
−E[yit|λt = λ, 1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} = 0, xit = x, ai = a])
= β1
I will show the trend of labor force participation rate in Figure 3 and 4. According to
Figure 3 and 4, before age 60, there is no difference in the trend between people with birth
year from 1941 and 1945 and people with birth year from 1946 and 1950. According to
Figure 3 and 4, the male labor force participation rate of people with birth year between
1946 and 1950 is larger than people with birth year between 1941 and 1945 after age 60.
However, the labor force participation rate of people with birth year between 1946 and 1950
is also larger than people with birth year between 1941 and 1945 before age 60. As a result,
it is possible that this is not due to the effect of the government intervention. Next, I will
comment on Figure 5 and 6. According to Figure 5 and 6, there is a difference in the ratio of
self employment worker. As birth year is larger, the ratio of self employment worker becomes
larger. Of course, self employment workers are not subject to the government intervention.
According to these discussions, the labor force participation of people with birth year between
1941 and 1945 is smaller than people with birth year between 1946 and 1950 after age 60
although the ratio of people which is subject to the government intervention is samller. It is
possible that the effect of the government intervention is weak.
Next, I will discuss the trend of labor force participation of a particular group. I make
the following group; male elderly who is both working and not self-employed at the first wave
(birth year from 1941 to 1945) and male elderly who is both working and not self-employed
at the sixth wave (birth year from 1946 to 1950). This group seems to be directly influenced
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by this policy. In Figure 7, I show the trend of labor force participation between male elderly
who is both working and not self-employed at the first wave (birth year from 1941 to 1945)
and male elderly who is both working and not self-employed at the sixth wave (birth year
from 1946 to 1950). Before age 60, the trend is the same while there is a difference in
the labor force participation between people with birth year from 1941 to 1945 and people
with birth year from 1946 to 1950 after age 60. However, it is possible that this is not due
to the EESL. I will check this point in the estimation part. I have to control the factors
of respondent demographics and business cycle and so on. This group is a main target to
analyze in this paper because the effect of the government intervention seems to directly
influence this group.
I have to explain some weaknesses of this paper. The Preference Parameters Study asks
respondents only respondent birth year. As a result, I do not know an exact age when the
respondent is interviewed. In addition, I do not know exactly wether a respondent arrives at
their basic pensionable age (Flat-rate part). In this paper, I set age = survey year - birth
year. I set the basic pensionable age (Flat-rate part) based on Table 2. However, I do not
know the birth month. I set that the pension eligibility age of people with the birth year A
is equal to that of people with the birth date between A.4.2 and A+ 1.4.1.
I estimate the equation (7) by separating the following groups and report the results in
the next section. With respect to Group 2, I focus on the samples who work just before age
60. Wth respect to Group 3, I focus on the samples who work as an (not self-employed)
employee just before age 60. Finally, with respect to Group 4, I focus on the sample who are
not working just before age 60.
• Group 1: (birth year from 1941 to 1945) all female and male elderly vs (birth year from
1946 to 1950) all female and male elderly
• Group 2: (birth year from 1941 to 1945) female and male elderly working at the first
wave vs (birth year from 1946 to 1950) female and male elderly working at the sixth
wave
• Group 3: (birth year from 1941 to 1945) male elderly who is both working and not
self-employed at the first wave vs (birth year from 1946 to 1950) male elderly who is
both working and not self-employed at the sixth wave
• Group 4: (birth year from 1941 to 1945) female and male elderly who is not working
at the first wave vs (birth year from 1946 to 1950) female and male elderly who is not
working at the sixth wave
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Figure 3: Labor Participation (Male)(The Preference Parameters Study)(Blue: birth year
from 1941 to 1945, Red: birth year from 1946 to 1950)
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Figure 4: Labor Participation (Female)(The Preference Parameters Study)(Blue: birth year
from 1941 to 1945, Red: birth year from 1946 to 1950)
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Figure 5: The Ratio of Self Employed Worker (Male)(The Preference Parameters
Study)(Blue: birth year from 1941 to 1945, Red: birth year from 1946 to 1950)
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Figure 6: The Ratio of Self Employed Worker (Male)(Census 2005)
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Figure 7: Labor Participation (Male, Not Self Employed)(The Preference Parameters
Study)(Blue: birth year from 1941 to 1945, Red: birth year from 1946 to 1950)
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5 Results
I will discuss the results in this paper. I will discuss the Table 2. This is the result
of Group 3. This is a main result. These elderly people seem to be directly influenced by
the EESL. As we can observe, the coefficient of 1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950}
is significantly negative of the OLS. However, when I omit the unobserved heterogeneity,
the coefficient of 1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} is not significant. The OLS
estimator of 1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} has a bias. The coefficent of
living with a parent is significantly negative. It is possible that this implies the decrease
of labor supply due to informal care of their parents. I cannot confirm this fact because
of data limitation. According to this result, the effect of the goverment intervention is
weak. I will discuss why I get this result in the next section. I will compare the result
here with the result which Kondo and Shigeoka (2016) estimate. According to Kondo and
Shigeoka (2016), the labor force participation rate of salaried workers with birth year 1946
is significantly larger than that of salaried workers with birth year 1945 at ages 60 and 61
by 2.4, 3.2 percent. The impact is small. However, they use the repeated cross sectional
data and do not control educational characteristics and other demographics. When I omit
the unobserved heterogeneity and control demographics of workers, I cannot confirm the
significant increase in the labor participation rate. However, the weakness of this paper
is that the sample size is small. In fact, the standard error of the coefficient of 1{60 ≤
ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} in FE result is large. The absolute value of the coefficient
1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} is comparatively large.
Next, I will discuss the Table 3. This is the result of Group 1. This result shows the
difference in the labor force participation between the elderly workers with birth year between
20
1941 and 1945 and the elderly workers with birth year between 1946 and 1950 by gender. As I
observe in the Table 3, I cannot get the significant result both in female and male labor force
participation when I omit the unobserved heterogeneity. In this analysis, the standard error
of the coefficient of 1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} is comparatively small and
the sample size is comparatively large. Table 4 shows the result of Group 2 ((birth year from
1941 to 1945) male elderly who is both working and not self-employed at the first wave vs
(birth year from 1946 to 1950) male elderly who is both working and not self-employed at the
sixth wave). Also in this case, the labor force participation rate of female and male workers
does not significantly increase when I estimate the model without omitting the unobserved
heterogeneity. When I omit the unobserved heterogeneity, I cannot get the significant effect
of the coefficient of 1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950}.
Finally, I will discuss the Table 5. This is the result of Group 4 ((birth year from 1941 to
1945) female and male elderly who is not working at the first wave vs (birth year from 1946
to 1950) female and male elderly who is not working at the sixth wave). While I cannot the
significant increase in the labor force participation rate in the Group 1, 2 and 3, I find the
significant decrease in the labor force participation rate between the elderly worker with birth
year between 1941 and 1945 and the elderly worker with birth year between 1946 and 1950.
When I omit the unobserved heterogeneity, there is a decrease in the labor force participation
rate both in female and male workers. This implies that the inflow of the elderly workers who
do not work around age 60 into the labor market decreases after the implementation of the
EESL. Especially for male workers, the effect is large. However, I cannot check whether this
effect is caused by the EESL or not. Because of the data limitation, for example, I cannot
compare the labor force participation around age 60 between the workers with birth year
from 1941 to 1945 and the workers with birth year from 1936 to 1940.
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Table 2: Labor Force Participation 1
(1) (2)
Male Not Selfemployed OLS Male Not Selfemployed FE
1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} 0.3242∗∗∗ 0.1599
(0.0669) (0.2926)
age -0.1571 0.1862
(0.2139) (0.2348)
age squared 0.0013 -0.0020
(0.0017) (0.0019)
married 0.0784 -0.0589
(0.0567) (0.0631)
the number of children 0.0915∗∗∗ -0.0164
(0.0172) (0.0286)
living with a parent -0.0514 -0.1665∗∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0518)
less than high school -0.0654 0.0064
(0.0450) (0.0570)
high school 0.0136 0.0832
(0.0330) (0.0584)
N 713 713
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The coefficients of asset level dummies in the previous period (high, middle),
a dummy of arriving at the basic pensionable age, wave dummies and regional dummies are omitted.
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Table 3: Labor Force Participation 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female OLS Male OLS Female FE Male FE
1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} 0.0533 0.1144∗∗∗ 0.0060 0.0540
(0.0348) (0.0380) (0.0306) (0.1377)
age -0.0235 -0.0344 0.0362 -0.0772
(0.0985) (0.0866) (0.0999) (0.1072)
age squared -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009)
married -0.1751∗∗∗ 0.1323∗∗∗ -0.0861 -0.0524
(0.0276) (0.0348) (0.0542) (0.0382)
the number of children 0.0631∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗ 0.0067 -0.0060
(0.0127) (0.0095) (0.0287) (0.0195)
living with a parent -0.0064 -0.0178 0.0405 -0.1028∗∗∗
(0.0400) (0.0245) (0.0424) (0.0278)
less than high school 0.1332∗∗∗ 0.0028 0.0043 0.0238
(0.0418) (0.0254) (0.0461) (0.0538)
high school -0.0039 0.0300 -0.0121 0.0423
(0.0359) (0.0193) (0.0366) (0.0436)
N 2306 2444 2306 2444
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The coefficients of asset level dummies in the previous period (high, middle),
a dummy of arriving at the basic pensionable age, wave dummies and regional dummies are omitted.
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Table 4: Labor Force Participation 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Work OLS Male Work OLS Female Work FE Male Work FE
1{60 ≤ ageit}1{1946 ≤ birthyeari ≤ 1950} 0.2161∗∗∗ 0.1671∗∗∗ 0.0661 0.0748
(0.0510) (0.0476) (0.0588) (0.1575)
age -0.5415∗∗ 0.0349 0.0744 0.1831
(0.2340) (0.1556) (0.2272) (0.1729)
age squared 0.0040∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0019
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0014)
married -0.1108∗∗∗ 0.0590 -0.0145 -0.0630
(0.0394) (0.0475) (0.0547) (0.0616)
the number of children 0.0914∗∗∗ 0.0508∗∗∗ 0.0357 -0.0218
(0.0195) (0.0129) (0.0395) (0.0269)
living with a parent -0.1544∗∗∗ 0.0031 -0.0613 -0.1059∗∗∗
(0.0566) (0.0297) (0.0597) (0.0391)
less than high school 0.1196 -0.0464 -0.0011 -0.0026
(0.0729) (0.0311) (0.0863) (0.0545)
high school 0.0578 -0.0491∗∗ -0.0305 0.0408
(0.0695) (0.0236) (0.0719) (0.0386)
N 785 1118 785 1118
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The coefficients of asset level dummies in the previous period (high, middle),
a dummy of arriving at the basic pensionable age, wave dummies and regional dummies are omitted.
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6 Discussion: What happened after the implementa-
tion of EESL?
As I discussed, I do not observe that there is the effect of the government intervention on
the employment of the elderly workers. In this section, I will consider why there is no effect
of the EESL on the employment of the elderly people. To understand the mechanism of this
policy effect, I confirm that we need to consider some channels of this policy effect. I discuss
this point in the section 2.2. Then, we have the following three questions.
• 1. Did the probability to receive a reemployment offer increase? (Channel 2)
• 2. Did the number of firms which abolished or increase the mandatory retirement age
increase? (Channel 3)
• 3. Did the acceptance rate of reemployment offers decrease by low wages offer by firms?
(Channel 1)
With respect to 1 and 2 (Channel 2 and 3), I can partly answer the questions because there
is a dataset to imply these facts. On the other hand, with respect to question 3, I cannot
answer it because there is no available data to clearly observe this point.
Table 8 shows whether a firm carries out the employment policy which the EESL re-
quires.10 In 2006 and 2007, almost all firms carry out the employment policy which the
EESL requires. According to Table 9, most of firms obey the EESL by introducing the
reemployment system.
Next, I will answer the question 1 by using the JSATR. There is a sharp increase in the
ratio of people receiving a reemployment offer after arriving at the mandatory retirement
age. I show the Figure 10. Reemployment offer 1 means the ratio of workers receiving
a reemployment offer from the firm where they arrive at the mandatory retirement age.
Reemployment offer 2 means the ratio of workers receiving a reemployment offer from the
firm where they arrive at the mandatory retirement age or the affiliated firms (including
Reemployment offer 1). According to Figure 10, there is a sharp increase in the ratio of
workers receiving a reemployment offer after the workers with 1946 birth year arrive at the
mandatory retirement age. According to Figure 10, the ratio of firms obeyig the EESL
increases after the workers with birth year 1946 arrive at the mandatory retirement age.
According this figure (reemployment 2), the ratio of workers receiving the reemployment
offer increases by about 10 percent. This part approximately shows the ratio of workers who
cannot get the reemployment offer without the EESL. It is possible that the rejection rate
of receiving the offer in this group is high. According to Usui et al. (2015), male employees
at age 54 gradually move to part-time work or retire after beginning to receive pension.
Those who continue to work cannot choose their optimal working hours although they want
to choose more working hours. Potentially, it is possible that there are some elderly people
10See the website http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/0000101253.html (Japanse web site)
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who cannot continue to work although he/she wants to continue to work if he/she receives a
reemployment offer.
With respect to the mandatory retirement age, there is a change in the distribution
between 2004 and 2008 at least with respect to the firms whose number of employees is less
than 300. According to Table 11, the ratio of firms preparing the mandatory retirement age
more than age 64 in 2004 is larger than that in 2008.
According to these facts, the firms change the employment policy after 2006 by mainly
giving a reemployment offer or increasing the mandatory retirement age. However, accord-
ing to this paper and the literature, the employment of the elderly workers do not largely
change after the workers with birth year 1946 arrives at age 60. The firms have obeyed the
government directions; introducing the reemployment system or abolishing the mandatory
retirement age or increasing the mandatory retirement age. The analysis of Channel 1 is
important when we understand what happened after the implementation of the EESL. This
will be an important future work. It is possible that the firm tried to reduce the cost of
obeying the EESL by decreasing the wage after the mandatory retirement age when they
make an contract with the workers arriving at the mandatory retirement age. There is no
clear statement with respect to wage contract when a firm gives a reemployment offer to a
worker. Kondo (2016) finds a decline in earnings of the elderly workers who reached age 60
after 2006. This evidence is based on only observable wage. The offered wage when making
a contract of the reemployment after the implementation of the EESL should be analyzed.
It is possible that some workers reject an offer because of the offered wage is too low.
Figure 8: The Ratio of Firms Preparing the Employment Measures for the Aged (The Em-
ployment of the Elderly Workers)(Ministry of Health, Labor and Wealfare)
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Figure 9: The Ratio of the Employment Measures for the Aged (All Firms Preparing the
Employment Measures)(The Employment of the Elderly Workers)(Ministry of Health, Labor
and Wealfare)
0	 20	 40	 60	 80	 100	
Abolishing	the	Mandatory	
Re9rement	
Increasing	the	Mandatory	
Re9rement	Age	
Introducing	Reemployment	
System	
2007	 2006	 %	
Figure 10: The Ratio of Receiving Reemployment Offer (JSTAR)
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Figure 11: Employment Policy for Elderly Workers at 2004 and 2008: Retirement Age (Only
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: Less than 300 workers)(Fact-finding Survey on the
Work Conditions among Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (Chusho kigyo rodo jijo jittai
chosa))(MRA: Mandatory Retirement Age)
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Finally, I show the change in the wage contract when a worker receives a reemployment
offer form the firm where he/she arrives at the mandatory retirement age. Figure 12 shows
whether worker’s wage decreases or not after reemployment. This figure shows the ratio of
whether worker’s wage decreases or not after reemployment. According to this figure, the
ratio of receiving a decreased wage after reemployment increases by 10 percent after a worker
with birth year more than 1946 arrives at the mandatory retirement age. However, I do not
know this is due to the EESL. It is favourable that I compare the worker with birth year
1945 and the worker with birth year 1946. However, the enough sample size is not available
with respect to only workers with birth year around 1945 and 1946. In addition, I show the
Figure 13. The figure 13 shows the distribution of the wage decrease rate when receiving a
reemployment offer. According to this figure, there is an increase in the ratio of the wage
decrease rate between 30 percent and 70 percent. However, this is also not the dataset which
includes only workers with birth year around 1945 and 1946.
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Figure 12: The Ratio of Whether Wage Decreases After Reemployment (Reemployment
Contract)(Only Workers Receiving a Reemployment Offer)(JSTAR)(before 1945: birth year
before 1945, after 1946: birth year after 1946)
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Figure 13: The Ratio of Wage Decrease After Reemployment (Reemployment Contract)(Only
Workers Receiving a Reemployment Offer)(JSTAR)(before 1945: birth year before 1945, after
1946: birth year after 1946)
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7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of the government intervention to the demand side of
the labor market on the employment of the elderly. In this paper, I show that there is no
significant effect of the EESL on the employment of the elderly. In addition, I also show that
the inflow of the elderly people not working around age 60 into the labor market is significantly
negative. According to the discussion in section 6, the firms obey the government’s directions;
introducing the reemployment system or abolishing the mandatory retirement or increasing
the mandatory retirement age. This suggests that a firm have tried to reduce the cost they
will burden because of the government policy by using the actions which the government does
not prohibit. The number of reemployment offers has increased after the implementation of
the EESL.
There is no clear statement in the law with respect to wage contract when a firm gives
a reemployment offer to a worker arriving at the mandatory retirement age. As I have
explained in the section 6, many firms introduce the reemployment system or increase the
mandatory retirement age without abolishing the mandatory retirement age. When a firm
makes a reemployment contract with a worker, they discuss the decrease rate of wage with
the worker who intend to work in the firm after the mandatory retirement age. The law
does not concretely oblige anything with respect to the decrease rate of wage contract. The
following question is important to directly analyze the reason why the employment of the
elderly worker has not increased.
• 3. Did the acceptance rate of reemployment offers decrease by low wages offer by firms?
(Channel 1)
Especially, the effect on Channel 1 is very interesting. In this study, I show that there was
no positive effect on the employment of the elderly. However, firms might decrease an offered
wage because they have to give an offer to reemploy. After the mandatory retirement age,
firms can offer wage rate which is not regulated strictly. As a result, firms have an incentive
to decrease an offered wage. This is an interesting future work.
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